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Abstract: The means by which fruit and vegetables growers are linked with the upstream partners in the 
supermarket supply chain are investigated in 15 semi-structured interviews with inter alia the managers of 
Croatia’s five major supermarket chains. 
Contrasting to existing literature we find that supermarkets vertically coordinate with larger growers 
directly through loose 1-year marketing contracts specifying the terms of payment, without giving 
financial or technical assistance to the farmers. An exception is the largest Croatian supermarket which 
has a dominant position in the market and sometimes provides comprehensive farm assistance or even 
fully vertically integrates farm production.  
Wholesalers more often provide farm assistance to FFV growers. Though, in the future it can be expected 
that the wholesalers drop out of the FFV supermarket supply chain. The major bottleneck for farmers to 
directly supply to the supermarket chains is the access to a distribution facility for grading, sorting and 
packaging of FFV. Also, farmers need to organize to meet the supermarkets’ minimum quantity 
requirements. Since bad experience with cooperatives in the communist era is widespread, farmers 
distaste cooperatives and the degree of organization of FFV growers in Croatia is very low. 
We present an innovative model for a producer organization which could overcome the main challenges 
growers face in the FFV supermarket supply chain and secure that even small farmers participate. Also, 
we outline policy measures for the Croatian government and the European Commission to foster this 
development. 
 






During the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe, the retail sector was privatized and 
relationships along the whole food supply chain - from farmers to retailers – collapsed implying serious 
disruptions of supply. Concurrently, international retailers and processors entered the new markets 
introducing their own business models and consumers’ demand for food quality and safety strengthened 
(Hanf and Pieniadz, 2007). This required significant reforms and adjustments in the structure of food 
commodity chains, and food supply of higher quality and safety. In this context an increased degree of 
vertical coordination between transaction partners along the supply chain, became a widespread means to 
overcome problems of insufficient supply and minor quality particularly in the transition countries in 
Europe and Central Asia (Swinnen, 2005; World Bank, 2005). 
Strong vertical coordination between farmers and retailers within supplier contracting is observed by 
Reardon et al. (2003), Dries et al. (2004) and World Bank (2005) in the FFV supermarket supply chain in 
Croatia. Supplier contracting of supermarkets includes the provision of farm assistance programs, as 
found by World Bank (2005: 8) or the establishment of outgrower schemes, as suggested by Reardon 
(2003: 11). Dries et al. (2004) finds that that the 2 largest supermarket chain guarantee loans for capital 
investment of their outgrowers to acquire greenhouses and irrigation (pg. 30). Besides, Dries et al. (2004) 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on data gathered within a World Bank project.   2
report on the acquisition of dedicated wholesalers by large supermarket chains in order to have their own 
preferred supplier program (pg. 29). 
Before this background, our paper aims to identify the degree of vertical coordination in contracting 
between the FFV suppliers and the supermarket chains, focusing on the role of farm assistance and 
outgrower schemes. Also, we aim to identify the major drivers of future changes in the FFV supermarket 
supply chain and develop policy recommendations to foster its further development. Furthermore, we 
enlighten the challenges faced by farmers to link with the FFV supermarket supply chain. We develop an 
innovative model for a grower organization which could overcome these challenges and secure that even 
small farmers participate in this supply chain.  
Transactions exhibiting the lowest degree of coordination are conducted via spot markets where a 
transaction is based on a price agreement only. A higher degree of coordination is achieved through 
vertical coordination by contract farming which might be implemented within an outgrower scheme or a 
preferred supplier program by providing assistance to the farmers with the aim to increase supply 
quantity, quality or to reduce seasonality. 
The highest degree of coordination is achieved by full vertical coordination which is called vertical 
integration, where one firm controls different levels of the value chain, implying that market transactions 
are replaced by intra-firm transactions. This can be achieved by either forming a subsidiary, a merger or 
an acquisition. 
In general, farm assistance is provided to improve farmers’ access to basic production factors as capital 
and inputs or know-how and information (knowledge and experience). In particular, farm assistance may 
include the provision of extension and management advisory services, prepayment to finance the harvest, 
credit, leasing or rental of farm machinery, bank loan guarantee, quality control and inputs (e.g. 
seedlings). Farm assistance may be provided within bilateral contracts e.g. between the farmer and the 
processor or the farmer and the input provider. Farm assistance may be provided within complex contract 
systems also. For example a triangular agreement includes three partners, e.g. a farmer, a processor and a 
bank. 
The situation in the FFV supermarket supply chain is the result of an extremely rapid growth of Croatia’s 
retail sector, which is among the fastest in the world. Not until 2001, when foreign retailers first entered 
the market, supermarkets started to offer a broad assortment of FFV in their stores, which had before 
primarily be sold in the street markets (Reardon et al., 2003). Today, FFV is sold to Croatian consumers 
mainly through the stores of large national and international supermarket chains. According to experts’ 
estimation the share of FFV sold through supermarkets currently amounts between 60-70%. 
Our analysis is based on in-person, semi-structured interviews with the managers of the FFV procurement 
of Croatia’s 5 major national and international supermarket chains Kaufland, Konzum, Mercator, Metro 
and Spar accounting for about 70% of the FFV supermarket business in Croatia. Also, wholesalers, 
grower cooperatives, individual growers and the national fruit growers association were interviewed. In 
addition, the Croatian Agricultural Extension Institute, the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Croatian Postal Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture were interviewed. The interviews are 
conducted based on a questionnaire composed of questions on 1) the design of the firm’s vertical 
coordination mechanism with its farm suppliers (structure of the firm’s farm suppliers, contract design), 
2) the farm assistance program (type of assistance provided, eligibility criteria, impact) and 3) the future 
development of the supermarket FFV supply chain and how this could be fostered by policy measures. 
The interviews were conducted in January 2009 in Croatian and English language. The length of the 
interviews varied between 1 to 2 hours. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the different models of the FFV supermarket 
supply chain found in Croatia and section 3 gives details on how farmers vertically coordinate with their 
upstream partners. Section 4 addresses the future development of the supermarket FFV supply chain in 
the near future. Section 5 focuses on the organization of FFV growers in Croatia and presents an 
innovative model for a producer organization which could secure that even small farmers participate in 
this supply chain. Section 6 concludes, presents policy implications and outlines suggestions for further 
research. 
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2 The structure of the FFV supermarket supply chain 
Several models of the supermarket supply chain for FFV in Croatia from the fruit and vegetables growers 
via supermarkets to the consumers currently exist (Figure 1). 
In general, the product flow is as follows (Figure 1a): the harvested fruit and vegetables enter the 
distribution facility to be washed, sorted, graded and packed. Next, the packed produce is transported to a 
regional distribution center. The quality control is generally conducted in the distribution center before 
the produce is stored in a cooling facility and the individual assortment for the supermarket stores is 
compiled. The assortments of the fruit and vegetables are then distributed to the supermarket stores. 
The distribution facility may be owned by a large farmer or a farmers’ cooperative (F) or a dedicated 
wholesaler (WS). The regional distribution center may be owned by a wholesaler (WS) or a retailer (R). It 
is possible that a large farmer or cooperative delivers the produce directly to a supermarket’s stores 
without entering the distribution center. The distribution of the assortments of the fruit and vegetables to 
the supermarket stores (R/C) is organized by a logistic firm, a supermarket which has an own fleet, or the 
farmers. 
The structure of the FFV supply chain of Kaufland is very similar to Mercator (Figure 1b). Kaufland is a 
German supermarket chain with 22 supermarket stores. Mercator is a Slovenian supermarket with 26 
hypermarkets and 11 supermarkets in Croatia. Kaufland as well as Mercator organize not only the 
domestic FFV procurement but also the procurement in foreign countries. Also, Kaufland and Mercator 
dispose over a distribution center. In both cases, the wholesaler or the farmer own the distribution facility. 
The produce may be delivered directly from a FFV grower or a grower cooperative to the retailer’s 
distribution center, in case the farmer is able to deliver a minimum quantity and quality (Kaufland is 
working directly with fruit farmers with a size of at least 10 ha), and has access to a distribution facility 
also. Alternatively, the produce is delivered from the FFV grower, possibly of a farm of smaller size, via 
a wholesaler, which disposes over a distribution facility, to the supermarket’s distribution center. Thus, 
smaller farmers deliver to the supermarket’s distribution facility via wholesalers, and larger farmers and 
cooperatives may deliver to the distribution facility directly. The assortments of FFV is transported from 
the distribution center to each store by an external logistics firm in the case of Kaufland and by an own 
fleet in the case of Mercator. 
Metro is a German retailer wholesaler with 6 cash & carry stores and Spar2 is an Austrian supermarket 
chain with 6 hypermarkets in Croatia. The FFV supply chain of Metro and Spar differs slightly to the 
above described, since they do not have an own distribution center (Figure 1c). Instead, Metro utilizes one 
of its wholesalers as its logistical partner, which compiles the assortments for the individual stores in its 
distribution center, and organizes the transport to the supermarkets’ stores. Alternatively, large suppliers 
might directly deliver the products to Metro’s stores. Similarly, Spar’s suppliers directly deliver the 
assortments to the chain’s stores. Metro’s and Spar’s FFV department do procure FFV domestically only, 
and the FFV imports are organized by the wholesalers completely. 
Konzum is a national chain which is the largest supermarket chain in Croatia accounting for about 40% of 
all FFV sales according to experts’ estimates. Konzum belongs to Agrokor and owns a distribution 
facility but also is in control of 5 distribution centers, and 650 supermarket stores of different size allover 
Croatia. Besides, Konzum owns fruit and vegetables production facilities. Since the beginning of 2009, 
the domestic FFV procurement of Konzum is mainly done by Agrofructus, a holding of packing houses 
and buying stations which is owned by Agrokor as well. Before, Konzum’s domestic procurement was 
done by dedicated wholesalers which Konzum had acquired some years before. However, Konzum 
organizes the FFV import and is engaged in the FFV export also. Konzum is also the owner of Velpo, a 
special distributor for hotels and restaurants.  
Konzum mainly operates in a fully vertically integrated FFV supply chain, since it has acquired and is 
still acquiring further individual FFV producers, producer cooperatives and specialized wholesalers which 
are combined in the holding Agrofructus (Figure 1d). Also, any of the models of the FFV supply chain 
given in Figures 1b and 1c can be found within Konzum’s FFV supply chain, since Konzum procures 
FFV directly from large farmers or independent wholesalers which may directly deliver the distribution 
centers. 
                                                 
2 Spar Croatia is to 30% owned by Metro Croatia.   4
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Figure 1: Structure of the FFV supermarket supply chain in Croatia (own illustration) 
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3 Vertical coordination of growers 
Kaufland, Mercator, Metro and Spar have loose one-year written marketing contracts with 100% of the 
FFV growers, which directly supply their produce to the supermarkets (Figures 1b and 1c). The main 
element specified in the contract is the payment scheme. A supermarket orders 24-28 hours ahead of 
product delivery. A FFV grower under contract is expected to deliver quantity demanded by the 
supermarket, though a supermarket is not committed to procure FFV from the grower under contract, but 
may source the produce elsewhere. In general, supermarkets pay within 40-60 days whereas wholesalers’ 
payment may exceed 100 days upon product delivery. Also, the investigated supermarkets (with the 
exception of Konzum) do not engage in any kind of farm assistance as e.g. providing inputs, a trade or 
credit guarantee, machinery rental and technical advice. 
In contrast, Konzum has loose one-year contracts with 10% of its suppliers only. Also, Konzum provides 
farm assistance and bilateral structured finance of varying degree and kind, which may include inputs, 
machinery rental or technical advice, and credits. Konzum distinguishes between 3 types of suppliers: It 
has the strongest relationships with the “A” suppliers, followed by “B” suppliers and the relationship is 
rather low with the “C” suppliers with which Konzum works rarely only. The FFV growers acquired by 
Konzum are provided the most comprehensive assistance within outgrower schemes.  
Besides Konzum, growers are assisted by wholesalers which are in fierce competition with supermarkets 
for the local farmers’ supply. Mostly, the wholesalers provide inputs to growers, and the grower delivers 
produce in exchange later during the harvest season.  
More comprehensive farm assistance including direct structured finance through credits, technical advice 
and machinery rental is given by wholesalers, which serve a domestic niche market or an export market 
with produce of premium quality. 
For example, Fragaria is a domestic wholesaler with own FFV production and production of inputs (e.g. 
seedlings for strawberries) which serves a niche market in Croatia and also exports produce of premium 
quality. Fragaria provides comprehensive support to its FFV growers by its own consultants, which give 
advice in plant protection and plant technology. Also, apple growers are prepaid by 25% of their expected 
harvest to finance machinery rental and workers required for harvesting. Fragaria may support its farmers 
in investments. For example, together with a Swedish FFV importer, Fragaria gives financial support for 
the establishment of raspberry production of the size of 100 ha, which will be paid back by the farmers in 
produce within 5 years. Also, the company rents machines required in strawberry production to its 
farmers which may pay back the rental fee in produce. 
The low importance of farm assistance and structured finance instruments has several causes. The 
managers of the supermarkets point out that they do not engage in farm assistance, since the margins in 
the FFV business are low and thus the profitability of such kind of investments is low
3 also. In addition, 
fruit and vegetables production in Croatia bears high risks with regard to drought, hail and frost due to 
missing protection measures as e.g. irrigation systems, hail nets and respective insurance schemes. 
Further, interviewees point out that the commodity price risk is very high for FFV in Croatia. Due to 
missing market information systems, the quantities of vegetables supplied and thus prices vary 
substantially between seasons
4. A further factor which might explain why supermarkets do not engage in 
farm assistance is that supermarkets are not fully reliant on the domestic FFV supply. Supermarkets have 
the option to acquire FFV by imports from foreign countries. 
 
 
                                                 
3 One interviewee mentioned that a supermarket almost makes no profits by selling FFV. Though, the FFV 
department is the most important with regard to the supermarkets’ attractiveness. Consumers’ choice of a 
supermarket is determined to a high degree by the preferences for a supermarkets assortment and freshness of 
FFV. 
4 For example, an interviewee reported that this just recently happened in the case of cabbage. During the previous 
harvest the supply of cabbage was low, and thus cabbage prices were high. This induced the farmers to grow a lot 
of cabbage and thus the supply in the consequent harvest was high and the price was low.   6
4 Future developments 
The future development of the FFV supermarket supply chain in Croatia is characterized by the increase 
in the importance of the supermarkets’ domestic procurement directly from the farmers and the decrease 
of dedicated wholesalers providing general services to supermarkets.  
All interviewees belonging to the 5 major supermarkets stated that they have planned to further increase 
domestic procurement. According to interviewees’ estimates
5 domestic procurement accounted for 50-
70% of all FFV sold through supermarkets in 2008. For example, the share of imported apples of all 
apples sold in Croatia amounted about 50% in 2007 (MAFWM, 2007; Robbrecht, 2004 and 2007). 
Mercator, Metro and Spar aim to increase domestic procurement directly from the farmer, which 
currently accounts for between 60-70% of domestic procurement (without bananas, citrus and tropical 
fruits), and to decrease domestic procurement through wholesalers. 
Metro and Spar have planned to establish a joint distribution center in September 2009 and to extend their 
FFV department. This includes the engagement in the import of FFV. Thus, the main functions of the 
wholesalers will be taken over by Metro and Spar themselves. 
Konzum has planned to increase sourcing from its own production plants, implying that the direct 
business with other farmers will be reduced. Thus, Konzum aims to mainly procure FFV from its own 
production and from the production under outgrower scheme in the future, supplemented by the supply of 
its own wholesaler Agrofructus. Besides, Konzum will increasingly engage in the export of FFV6, and 
has already started to establish a system of buying stations throughout the neighboring countries of former 
Yugoslavia. 
The major driving forces of increasing local procurement are consumers’ strong preference for locally 
produced FFV and freshness, and the higher flexibility of domestic compared to international 
procurement. As an example, vegetables originating in Spain have to be ordered in trucks, and might have 
to be stored in cooling facilities for some time, whereas vegetables grown in Croatia may be ordered in 
smaller quantities, thus they need not to be stored and therefore the freshness of the products is higher. 
These future developments will have as its consequence that the demand for the general service provided 
by wholesalers decreases. Therefore, wholesalers will drop out of the supermarket FFV supply chain 
unless they reorganize or specialize in serving a niche or the export market, e.g. with FFV of premium 
quality. Since primarily wholesalers provide farm assistance to growers, the importance of farm 
assistance will further decrease. Outgrower schemes involving comprehensive farm assistance will 
remain of importance for Konzum besides the wholesalers engaged in the marketing of premium quality 
FFV. If Konzum is successful in its export business, Konzum might further extend its outgrower scheme 
and thus the provision of farm assistance. 
One of the major factors hindering that local procurement of the FFV supermarket supply chain increases 
is that the vast majority of FFV is cultivated on orchards smaller than 1 ha. Small farmers do not meet the 
minimum quantity requirements of the supermarkets, and investment costs of a distribution facility are 




                                                 
5 The share of domestic procurement varies depending on the product and the season. For example, bananas and 
oranges are imported to 100%. Apples are imported more in the time period March to the new harvest, due to 
missing cooled storage facilities for domestically produced apples. In general, domestic procurement is higher 
during summer and lower during winter time. Currently, fruit plantations account for 2.2% and vegetable 
plantations for 9.3% of total agricultural land (MAFWM, 2007). 
6 There is large potential for FFV production in Croatia which offers excellent opportunities for export to the EU, 
since Croatia’s harvest season starts earlier than in most EU countries.   7
5 Grower organization in the FFV sector in Croatia 
5.1 Organization in cooperatives  
For small farmers to enter the FFV supermarket supply chain it is essential that they organize and invest 
in a distribution facility jointly which allows compiling assortments of the required quantity. 
However, the degree of organization of FFV growers
7 in Croatia is low. According to the database of the 
Croatian Association of Cooperatives (2009) there are 82 fruit cooperatives, 29 vegetable cooperatives, 
and 41 fruit and vegetable cooperatives in Croatia. Though, according to an expert’s opinion, 98% of the 
listed cooperatives do not professionally act in the FFV market. 
Present and past experience with cooperatives in the FFV sector in Croatia shows that organizing farmers 
in cooperatives faces particular problems. Cooperatives have an old tradition in Croatia tracing back to 
the nineteenth century, but a lot of farmers have made bad experience with cooperatives in the communist 
era, thus the willingness of farmers to organize in cooperatives is low. There are several examples for 
cooperatives which failed because its members could not reach a consensus on how to manage the 
cooperative due to high mistrust in each other. Also, some farmers understand a cooperative as a point of 
last resort (retreat position) through which they sell when all other marketing channels are exhausted. 
There are numerous examples for cooperative members who also have individual contracts and business 
relationships with wholesalers and retailers and thus directly weaken the negotiation power of their 
cooperative. 
Furthermore, interviewees pointed out that establishing a new cooperative under current market 
conditions is very difficult in Croatia. The investment costs of a distribution facility are high, and 




5.2 Cooperatives - a superior organization model? 
In the EU it is very common for fruit and vegetable growers to organize in cooperatives. For example, in 
the horticultural sector
8 in Germany there exist 96 marketing cooperatives with about 32,000 members 
and a revenue of 2.3 billion Euros in 2006 (DRV 2009). In the Netherlands, the Greenery is one of the 
largest cooperatives in the FFV sector with 1,250 FFV growing members and a turnover of 1.6 billion 
Euros in 2003 (Gouveia, 2007). The Greenery is even a market dominant player (Bijman and Hendrikse, 
2003). Though the organization of farmers in a cooperative is not free of problems and alternative models 
of organization might allow overcoming these problems. 
In general, a cooperative can be understood as a user-owned and user-controlled business that distributes 
benefits upon the basis of use (Barton, 1989). Thus, the principles of cooperatives can be delineated by 
the identity of users and owners, the democratic principle of voting, i.e. each member has one vote and 
decisions are made in accordance with majority vote, and the non-existence of entry barriers. 
Additionally, the legally manifested business aim to nurture their members can be seen as a further 
characteristic of cooperatives (Anschhoff and Henningsen, 1986; Laurinkari and Brazda, 1990). 
Establishing countervailing power is regarded as the most important duty of a cooperative (van Dijk, 
1997). Other business aims such as correcting market failure, guaranteeing markets, and enhancing 
margins can be seen as levers to implement the main business aim (Cook, 1997). In the context of vertical 
                                                 
7 There were 304,783 family farms producing fruit out of which 13,311 (4.36%) produced fruit with modern 
technology on plantations in 2003. About 44% of the family farms cultivate fruit on orchards and plantations of 
the size smaller than 1 ha, and 23% of the size between 1 and 3 ha. (MAFWM, 2007). Also, there are 132 legal 
entities of which about 90% have fruit plantations of over 10 ha under cultivation. In the vegetables sector there 
are 138,428 family farms of which 46% cultivate a production area smaller than 1 ha, and 41% of the size 
between 1 and 5 ha in 2003. Besides, there are about 300 legal entities out of which 42% cultivate more than 30 
ha of production area with vegetables (MAFWM, 2007: 101-102). In the meantime, the size of the family farms 
might have increased to some extend due to a governmental incentive program for investments in orchards. 
8 This comprises fruit, vegetables, flowers and tree production with fruit and vegetables accounting for about 72%.   8
coordination and contract farming, Sykuta and Cook (2001) show that co-ops' governance structure and 
ownership give them an advantages over investor owned firms. This is a result of farmers which are more 
willingly to accept contracts by their ‘own’ cooperative, assuming that they are not cheated (Schulze et 
al., 2007). 
However, the organization of farmers in cooperatives is not free of problems. By using a property rights 
approach, Cook (1995) points to five general sets of problems: free riding, horizon costs, portfolio costs, 
control costs, and influence cost. Furthermore, since it is not clear who is the principal and who is the 
agent, thus the cooperative as well as its members can be both the principal and the agent (Eilers and 
Hanf, 1999), it is difficult for a cooperative to enforce leadership mechanisms and selective terms of 
delivery. This implies that the members can deliver the products of minor quality which alternative 
dealers do not accept. Cooperatives that are forced to accept these commodities face the problem of 
adverse selection. Furthermore, applying a game theory model Karantininis and Zago (2001) show that 
farmers prefer to sell their commodities to investor-owned firms than to open co-ops. Moreover, member 
heterogeneity e.g. with regard to the farm size, can be regarded as a source of problems. Bijman (2005) 
deduces that membership heterogeneity could cause a number of inefficiency problems, including agency 
problems, commitment problems, decision-making problems, opportunistic behaviour, coordination 
problems, and problems regarding the strategic focus. Fulton and Giannakas (2001) show that member 
heterogeneity may lead to the decrease of member commitment because members do not see a strong 
connection between the success of the co-op and their own business. 
 
 
5.3 Organization in an innovative model 
To overcome these deficits, we suggest that FFV growers organize according to an innovative model 
beyond a traditional cooperative and to invest in a distribution facility
9 jointly.  
1. To handle the possible mistrust between the FFV growers, a more hierarchical model of organization 
should be chosen. For example, an external manager should be hired to manage the producer 
organization. 
2. To avoid that farmers weaken the power of the producer organization by selling through direct 
contracts with retailers, the members of the producer organization could be forced to supply a yearly 
minimum quantity through the producer organization. Thus, the members have not only the right but also 
the obligation to deliver their products to the producer organization, which might be legally enforceable 
(Drescher and Ratjen, 1999).  
3. To overcome the above explained cooperative inherent quality problems in order to comply with the 
quality requirements of the supermarkets the producer organization could implement a particular quality 
enhancing program. This should enable the growers to deliver produce of the required quantity to the 
cooperative and avoid the negative effects of penalizing growers for non-compliance with quality 
standards. 
4. One interviewee suggested that the ability of a new producer organization to build relationships to the 
supermarket chains could be facilitated by gaining an existing company involved in the provision of 
wholesaling services to supermarkets as a member of the cooperative. Also, by becoming a member of 
the cooperative, the company could bring in its management knowledge and in case it is also involved in 
the production of FFV provide technical advice to the cooperative’s members. Besides, this would 
increase the producer organization’s credibility vis-à-vis banks. The above described heterogeneity of the 
members might be a minor challenge since we have a fit of the strategies as well as the goals of the 
different members. 
5. To make a new producer organization attractive for an existing company which is successful in the 
FFV wholesaling business, it might be more favorable to organize the cooperative as a trade company 
than as a cooperative. This model of a producer organization would allow benefiting from EU pre-
                                                 
9 The distribution facility should provide storing and cooling space, and facilities for e.g. cleaning, sorting, packaging 
and labeling of fresh fruit and vegetables, which enable growers to directly supply their produce to supermarkets.   9
accession funds like SAPARD and IPA-RD. This is one more advantage of this innovative model of a 
producer organization in comparison with establishing a new cooperative. Also, the producer organization 
could apply for an investment grant within the capital investment program of the government. 
The currently established joint venture between the domestic wholesaler Fragaria, which is also engaged 
in the production of FFV and inputs, and the fruit cooperative Velika Ludina (50 km east of Zagreb) 
exhibits several features of the suggested alternative model of grower organization. Velika Ludina 
comprises about 50 fruit growers out of which 25 are professional producers with orchards larger 1 ha. 
The main produce is apples, supplemented by strawberries and other berries. Some of the cooperative’s 
members have established business relationship with Fragaria, and thus are already supplying their fruits 
to Fragaria. 
With this joint venture, Velika Ludina and Fragaria follow two main objectives: 
 (1) To create a unique apple production system based on Fragaria’s technical know-how and experiences. 
This should allow producing high-quality apples which are sold as branded products. The production 
system requires the usage of not only inputs, in particular young trees, but also production and transport 
technology of superior quality. Fragaria has agreed to provide the cooperative’s members with the 
required knowledge. 
(2) To establish a joint cooling facility with controlled atmosphere of a capacity of 2,000 t and a storage 
facility. The investment is expected to amount to about 1.35 million Euros. This would allow storing the 
apples so that they can be supplied to the supermarkets almost year-round via Fragaria’s existing 
wholesaling channel. 
This project is beneficial to the apple growers of the cooperative as well as to the wholesaler Fragaria: 
The apple producers can increase their revenues due to increased quality of their produce and cooled 
storage, which allows selling the apples during time periods when higher prices prevail (particularly at the 
end of February until the beginning of the new harvest). The apple producers could either sell their 
produce during the harvest at a fixed price or they could take over the risk of storing the produce and 
might realize a higher price by selling the produce later in the season. Fragaria could become more 
appealing to supermarkets and might realize higher prices if it can offer a year-round supply of high-





Previous studies argue that vertical coordination is important in the FFV sector and that FFV contracting 
is increasing rapidly with the development of a modern retail sector in countries of Eastern Europe. 
Studies on the FFV supermarket supply chain in Croatia argue that supplier contracting of supermarkets 
includes the provision of farm assistance programs or the establishment of outgrower schemes. 
The conclusions of our study are different. We find that the degree of vertical coordination is rather low. 
In particular our findings suggest that the leading model of vertical coordination between FFV growers 
and supermarkets is restricted to loose one-year contracts which mainly specify the terms of payment, 
without providing any kind of farm assistance by the supermarket. An exception is the largest Croatian 
supermarket Konzum/Agrocor which has a dominant position in the market. 
We further find that dedicated wholesalers are in general stronger vertically integrated with their 
supplying fruit and vegetable growers by granting farm assistance in addition to entering into a contract. 
Some specialized wholesalers which serve a domestic niche or the export market provide even more 
comprehensive farm assistance thus offering better chances for small farmers to be integrated in the FFV 
supply chain10. 
                                                 
10 This result is in line with BURMA AND SARANARK (2006) on the FFV supply chain in Thailand finding 
that a supply chain around an export company offers better chances for smallholder involvement than 
the FFV supermarket supply chain.   10
Also, our results do not confirm the finding of a previous study that the largest supermarket chains fully 
vertically integrate with dedicated wholesalers by acquisition to have heir own preferred supplier 
programs. According to our results, this holds for Konzum only and other large supermarket chains in 
Croatia have not acquired dedicated wholesalers. Instead, large supermarket chains and the dedicated 
wholesalers are in fierce competition for obtaining produce from the FFV growers. Our findings suggest 
that it can be expected in the future that the wholesalers drop out of the FFV supermarket supply chain, 
unless the wholesalers specialize in a niche or the export market. This implies that the share of smaller 
farmers in the FFV supermarket supply chain will decrease further, in case supermarket supply chain 
participation of smallholders is not especially promoted.  
Also, supermarkets have a strong interest to further increase local procurement of FFV, especially directly 
from larger farmers. One of the major factors hindering this development is that the vast majority of FFV 
is cultivated on orchards and plantations smaller than 1 ha. For FFV producers to directly link to the 
supermarkets they need to a) meet the minimum quality and quantity requirements, and b) have access to 
a distribution facility. Smaller farmers generally do not meet these requirements and therefore have to 
supply their produce via wholesalers to supermarkets, implying that a part of the margin is attributed to 
the middleman and reducing the farmer’s revenue. 
To foster the further development of the FFV sector in Croatia we encourage the Croatian government, 
the European Commission and international lenders to promote the organization of farmers and their joint 
investment in a distribution facility.  
We suggest farmers to organize beyond a cooperative in a producer organization which has an established 
successful wholesaler as one of its members. This increases the chance of the producer organization to be 
successful since the wholesaler’s existing relationships with supermarkets and the management 
knowledge can be utilized, and the credibility vis-à-vis banks might be higher. It would be optimal if the 
wholesaler is also engaged in the production of FFV such that technical advice can be carried forward to 
the other members of the cooperative.  
This model of a producer organization would allow not only the even smaller FFV growers but also the 
wholesalers to benefit, since the latter are expected to drop out of the supply chain unless they reorganize. 
Therefore, the Croatian government should create a legal framework for producers to organize not only in 
cooperatives, but also in more hierarchical models as e.g. a trade company in the form of a limited 
liability company or a joint stock company. Also, this would make it easier to win an established 
wholesaler as a member of the producer organisation since the cooperative’s rule one-member-one-vote 
does not necessarily apply. 
In addition, the European Commission could best foster the organization of FFV growers in Croatia by 
speeding up the process for Croatia to become a member of the EU. First, this would put additional 
pressure on Croatian FFV growers to overcome their distaste to organize since the EU market 
organization for FFV allows financial support to be attributed to FFV growers only through grower 
organizations. Also, since EU legislation allows farmers to organize beyond a cooperative in producer 
organizations according to EU regulation 2200/96, EU accession puts pressure on the Croatian 
government to create a legal framework for producer organizations. 
If the aim is to keep even smaller farmers in the FFV supermarket supply chain, then investments of 
organized FFV growers in a distribution facility, which is the primary bottleneck, should be supported 
financially by e.g. credit guarantees or the provision of investment funds. 
Also, technical assistance should be provided to the FFV growers regarding managing production and 
commodity price risk. The insufficient availability and affordability of efficient risk sharing instruments 
in Croatia restrict efficient risk management and generate a highly uncertain business environment. There 
is a high potential for upgrading the currently offered agricultural insurance in Croatia, particularly 
concerning vegetables production and greenhouse insurance. To tackle this issue, the Croatian 
Agricultural Extension Service should give education and advisory support to the fruit and vegetable 
growers. In lowering production risk, FFV growers might become more attractive for supermarkets 
providing farm assistance programs.  
In future research it should be more comprehensively investigated why the farm assistance provided in 
the FFV sector is particularly low, and is significantly lower than in other sectors as e.g. in the sugar or   11
the grain sector in Croatia. This should particularly account for the role of governmental market 
interventions in the different sectors. 
Our conclusion should be further tested by investigating vertical coordination in the FFV supply chain in 
neighboring countries, especially Serbia and Macedonia, which similarly to Croatia has excellent 
conditions for FFV productions. 
Also, the features of the above suggested innovative model for a producer organization should be defined 
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